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ATTACHMENT OF LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICIES:
WHAT REMAINS OF THE SEIDER DOCTRINE AFTER
SEVEN YEARS OF CONFLICT
I. INTRODUCTION
A person bringing an action to recover damages for personal injuries
suffered in an automobile accident must sue in a forum which has jurisdic-
tion over the defendant. This jurisdictional requirement may determine
whether the plaintiff brings his action in personam or in quasi in rem. If
the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction, that is, if he has sufficient
contacts with the forum state,' the plaintiff may bring his action "in per-
sonam." This would result in a determination of the personal rights and
obligations of the parties,' and whether or not the defendant appears and
presents a defense, he may be subject to a judgment for any amount that
is found warranted
If personal jurisdiction cannot be obtained, a "quasi in rem" action
may be brought by attaching property, or the res, of the defendant within
the forum state.' If the plaintiff is successful in his litigation, his claim
can be satisfied out of that property. In the event that the defendant
makes no appearance, the recovery is limited to the value of the property.5
While some jurisdictions allow the defendant to make a "limited" appear-
ance to defend the attached property,6 others do not grant this privilege,
and a defendant appearing to defend is considered to have appeared gen-
erally and is thereby subject to in personam liability. In the latter case,
recovery is not limited to the value of the attached property, and the de-
fendant must either default or defend and subject himself to the danger
of a larger recovery 7
Quasi in rem actions frequently raise disputes over whether the thing
sought to be ?attached is really property which can provide a basis for
attachment. The dispute becomes particularly keen when the thing is an
1 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
2 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1877); see S. TEX. L.J. 59 (1968).
3 E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 54 (c); Kirby v. Holman, 238 Iowa 355, 25 N.W.2d 664 (1947);
Hutchison v. Manchester St. Ry., 73 N.H. 271, 60 A. 1011 (1905).
4 Courts of the state where the property is deemed to have a sims have the power to
adjudicate claims sought to be satisfied out of property. Stein, Jurisdiction by Attachment
of Liability Insurance, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1075, 1077 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Stein].
5Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); 10 S. TEx. L.J. 59, 61-62 (1968). For an
explanation of the relatively rare in rem action, see Note, Minichiello v. Rosenberg: Garnishment
of Intangibles-In Search of a Rationale, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 407, 409 n.14 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as In Search of a Rationale]; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) CONFLICTS OF LAWS, Introductory
note to Ch. 3 (1971).
6 Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Midland Tire & Rubber Co., 285 F. 214 (6th Cir. 1922);
Cheshire Nat'l Bank v. Jaynes, 224 Mass. 14, 112 N. E. 500 (1916).
7 United States v. Balanovski, 236 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956).
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intangible, such as a debt.' Whether the thing sought to be attached was
really property (and therefore attachable) and whether the purported
property was actually located within the forum state were issues in the
controversial New York case, Seider v. Roth,0 in which the property was
the defendant's rights under an insurance policy. This note will trace the
development of Seider in New York, analyze the criticisms of the Seider
doctrine, and survey the treatment of insurance policy attachment by other
states.
II. SEEDER AND THE LAW OF NEW YoRK
Desiring to bring suit in their home state of New York after being
injured in an automobile accident in Vermont, the plaintiffs in Seider at-
tempted to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction over the defendant, a Canadian
citizen. Since the defendant did not possess any tangible property in New
York, the plaintiffs attached his liability insurance policy which was issued
in Canada by a company that was also doing business in New York. The
plaintiffs contended that the insurance company's obligation to defend and
indemnify the defendant was an attachable debt within the state. Affirm-
ing a lower court's refusal to dismiss the order of attachment, the Court of
Appeals of New York held that as soon as the accident occurred, the insur-
er's contractual obligation with the insured became an attachable debt un-
der New York law.10
The court of appeals viewed the obligation of the insurer as a fixed
debt as soon as the accident occurred and rejected the argument that the
plaintiff was seeking to levy upon a limited, conditional obligation not
absolutely payable at present or in the future. The court pointed to the
obligation of the insurance company to. investigate the accident and to pay
medical expenses and found that these duties were fixed even if suit were
never brought. Therefore the obligations under the policy were not con-
tingent and were attachable. 1
SA debt is subject to attachment Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905). Furthermore,
a debt may have its "sims" in several forums. 198 U.S. at 222; Western Union Tel. v.
Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961).
9 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E. 2d 312,269 N.Y.$.2d 99 (1966).
10 N.Y. CIV. PRAc. LAW R. [hereinafter cited NYCPLR] § 5201(a) (McKinney 1963_
provides:
A money judgment may be enforced against any debt, which is past due or which is
yet to become due, certainly or upon demand of the judgment debtor, whether it was
incurred within or without the state, to or from a resident or non-resident, unless it
is exempt from application to the satisfaction of the judgment. A debt may consist
of a cause of action which could be assigned or transferred accruing within or without
the state.
NYCPLR § 6202 provides:
Any debt or property against which a money judgment may be enforced as provided
in Section 5201 is subject to attachment. The proper garnishee of any such property
or debt is the person designated in Section 5201 ...
11 For the view that Seider created an exception to New York law and in reality allows a
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In writing the Seider opinion, Chief Judge Desmond relied heavily
on a prior New York case, Matter of Riggle's Estate,'2 which arose out of
an automobile accident in Wyoming. The plaintiff was a citizen of New
York, and the defendant was a resident of Illinois. The defendant died
after he was personally served with process, and the plaintiff then moved
to have antncillary administrator appointed for the defendant's liability
insurance policy (his only property in New York). This appointment
would enable her to continue the action in New York. The court granted
the motion and stated that the policy made the decedent's estate a creditor
and the insurer a debtor, sufficient to confer jurisdiction in New York for
this appointment. 13 The insurance policy was property for purposes of ad-
ministration. Judge Desnriond in Seider noted that even the dissent in
Riggle agreed that the company's obligation to defend and indemnify was
a debt.' 4
New York does not have a direct action statute permitting suit against
the insurer,15 and the court in Seider answered charges that it was judicially
creating such a right by stating the insurer had agreed to defend its in-
sured wherever jurisdiction was obtained over him, attachment of the in-
surer's obligation supported quasi in rem jurisdiction, and therefore the
insurer was required to defend. The debt or obligation of the insurer
existed in New York because the insurance company was present there. 6
Further, in what may be the key to the solution of the Seider dilemma, 7
the court found no policy reasons which militated against requiring the
insurance company to defend in New York even though the accident oc-
curred elsewhere. But the Seider decision did not discuss any policy rea-
sons for or against allowing suit by a non-resident, nor did it expressly
limit such attachment actions to New York residents.
In a vigorous dissent,18 Judge Burke systematically rejected the reason-
ing and conclusions reached by the majority. He argued that there was
nothing to attach in New York because the "debt" was only a promise
to defend and indemnify if a suit was begun and if damages were awarded.
He believed that this contingency fell within the New York statute which
allows attachment only of debts past due or certain to become due; there-
contingent obligation to be attached, see Comment, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction Based on Insurer's
Obligations, 19 STAN. L. REV. 654, 658 (1967).
12 11 N.Y.2d 73, 181 N.E.2d 436, 226 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962).
Is SuR CT. PRo. AcT § 208 (McKinney 1967) provides that for the purpose of conferring
jurisdiction upon the Surrogate Court, a debt owed to a deceased by a state resident is deemed
personal property.
14 17 N.Y.2d at 114,216 N.E.2d at 314,269 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
15 Direct action statutes permit suits directly against the insurance company rather than
against the actual tortfeasor. Watson v. Employers Liab. Corp, 348 U.S. 66, 68 (1954).
16 17 N.Y.2d at 114, 216.N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
17 See text following note 56.
18 17 N.Y.2d at 115, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103 (Burke, J., dissenting).
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fore, a debt subject to any contingency was not attachable. Judge Burke
also objected to the circular reasoning of the majority because the court
was allowing attachment of an obligation to obtain jurisdiction that was
not attachable until jurisdiction had been obtained. He argued that suit
must have been validly commenced before there was an obligation to de-
fend and that prior to suit no debt existed.'" Judge Burke distinguished
Riggle because the defendant there had been personally served before his
death; therefore jurisdiction had been obtained and the insurer's obliga-
tion, at least to defend, was fixed and no longer contingent. Addition-
ally, Judge Burke sought to distinguish the estate cases relied upon by
the majority because they were decided under administration statutes, and
he further argued that attachment for purposes of jurisdiction required
a different standard than that used to determine whether there was property
for purposes of appointing an administrator, 0° Finally, Judge Burke dis
missed the statement that any of the insurer's obligations to investigate
and make medical payments accrued immediately; he noted that the "duty"
to investigate is discretionary, not absolute, and that medical payments not
only have no relation to the third-party liability of the insurer, but also
are contingent upon proof of injury.
Seider v. Roth2' was the first American decision to declare the automo-
bile liability policy of an out-of-state defendant attachable as a debt, thus
allowing quasi in rem jurisdiction.' The decision has survived seven years
of intense criticism, 2 including demands for full reconsideration of the
decision; 24 however subsequent New York decisions applying Seider have
established the limitations and clarifications which were essential for sur-
vival. With these limitations, Seider has been adopted in California and
Minnesota.
In Jones v. McNei2  a New York court permitted resident-plaintiffs
to attach the insurance policy of a California resident who allegedly injured
the plaintiffs in New Mexico. The insurance company was doing business
in New York, and the court found, as in Seider, that the obligations of
19Id.
20 Judge Burke stated: "In the estate administration cases, where personal service on the
defendant was not made, the promise even though admittedly contingent in nature was deemed
sufficient property to constitute estate because no rights were determined by such appointment."
Id. at 16-17, 216 N.E.2d at 316, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 104.
21 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
22 Stein, supra note 13, at 1078. Seider-type actions are not limited to automobile insur-
ance policies. For example, malpractice insurance policies would also be attachable if the other
factors necessary to a Seider-type action are present. E.g., Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438
(2d Cir. 1973).
23 For a discussion of the Seider doctrine, see Stein, supra note 12; In Search of a Rationale,
supra note 10; Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and the Interstate
Corporation, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 550 (1967).
24 E.g., Comment, Attachment of "Obligations"-A New Chapter in Long-Arm Jurisdiction,
16 BuFFALo L. REV. 769, 780 (1967).
2551 Misc. 2d 527, 273 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
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the insurer were fixed and attachable. The court found no due process
violations since the property attached was within the forum state and the
defendant was notified by a reasonable method and had an opportunity to
be heard.26 The court also rejected the defendant's commerce clause chal-
lenge to jurisdiction, reasoning that attachment is not precluded merely
because the insurance company was engaged in interstate commerce.27 Yet
many of the questions unanswered by Seider, for example, the fear that if
a defendant appeared to defend he might be subjected to personal juris-
diction, the danger of default in case the defendant decided not to risk per-
sonal jurisdiction, and other constitutional problems, remained to be solved
by future cases.
Constitutional problems in Seider-type attachments were presented in
Lefcourt v. Sea Crest Hotel and Motor Inn, Inc.2s In a Massachusetts
accident, a New York resident was injured by an employee-driven, em-
ployer-owned truck insured by a company doing business in New York;
however neither the employer nor the employee were subject to the per-
sonal jurisdiction of a New York court. The court allowed attachmikent
of the defendant's liability policy and relied on the Seider view that the
insurer's obligation was not contingent because it was ascertainable at least
to the extent of medical payments. The court determined that such at-
tachment was not a denial of equal protection because the out-of-state de-
fendant was treated no differently than a New York defendant: both had
to submit to in personam jurisdiction under New York Civil Practice Law
and Rules § 320(c) in order to defend on the merits. The court acknowl-
edged a further difficulty that existed with these Seider-type suits: since
New York procedure did not permit a limited appearance, the defendant
was likely to stay out of New York and thus subject the insurer to default
without an adequate chance to defend.29 The court was able to avoid ruling
upon this possible due process violation because the only issue actually
presented was whether the defenses should be stricken. The defendants
also had contended that the court did not have personal jurisdiction over
them, that recovery could only be satisfied out of the property attached,
and that the attachment would deprive the defendant of due process of
26 Id. at 530, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 521. The court cited Olberding v. Illinois Central Ry.,
346 U.S. 338 (1953). In that federal diversity action, the Court found that the great potential
for injury and the mobility of the population required that the injured person have redress,
and the defendant need only be provided with a fair opportunity to defend. This method
was reasonable and due process standards were met.
27 51 Misc. 2d at 530, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 522. The court concluded that commerce was
not unduly hampered. For a discussion of the commerce clause aspects of the Seider doctrine,
see Stein, supra note 12, at 1087.
28 54 Misc. 2d 376, 282 N.Y.S.2d 896 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
29 If the defendant were to appear and defend on the merits, he could face judgment in ex-
cess of the policy limits because he would be subject to in personam jurisdiction. For criticism
of Seider before it was limited by other cases, see Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Con-
tingent Obligations and the Interstate Corporation, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 550 (1967).
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law because he would have to default to avoid personal jurisdiction and
this likelihood could deprive him of a defense conducted by the insurer.
The court, while not resolving these issues, did recognize the obvious dis-
advantages to the defendant and benefits to the plaintiff, who was given
"a lever for obtaining personal jurisdiction over absent or non-resident de-
fendants."8 0
Unhappiness with Seider3 ' led to a reconsideration in 1967 by the
New York court of appeals. One particular complaint had been that
apparently a non-New York resident could come to the state to sue quasi
in rem, and since New York had a history of high recoveries,82 a defendant
answering the merits might be personally liable to the extent the judgment
exceeded his policy limits. This problem, along with criticism of the reso-
lution of the contingency aspects of insurance policies and difficulties in
determining the value of the policy attached, led to widespread belief that
Seider was unconstitutional. 33 However, in Simpson v. Loehmann,84 the
Seider doctrine was clarified and upheld.
Plaintiffs in Simpson were an infant and her father, residents of New
York, who alleged that a Connecticut defendant's negligence had caused
the infant to be injured by a boat propeller in Connecticut waters. The
plaintiffs attached in New York the defendant's liability policy issued in
Connecticut by a company doing business in New York. The defendant
contended that the attachment violated due process, imposed an undue bur-
den on interstate commerce, and impaired the obligation of the insurance
contract. The court felt that the decision turned on whether the obligation
of the insurer to defend and indemnify enabled New York to exercise
quasi in rem jurisdiction, and it concluded:
It was our opinion when we decided [Seider, and it still is, that jurisdic-
tion in rem was acquired by the attachment in view of the fact that the
policy obligation was a debt to the defendant. And we perceive no denial
of due process since the presence of that debt in this State--contingent or
inchoate though it may be-represents sufficient of a property right in the
defendant to furnish the nexus with, and the interest in, New York to em-
power its courts to exercise an in rem jurisdiction over him.a5
3oLefcourt v. Sea Crest Hotel & Motor Inn, Inc., 54 Misc. 2d 376, 383, 282 N.Y.S.2d
896, 903 (1967).
31 See articles cited note 23 supra.
32 Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 316, 234 N.E.2d 669, 675, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633,
641 (1967) reargument denied, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N..E2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968)
(New York is a . mecca for those seeking high verdicts in personal injury cases") (Breitel,
J., concurring).
33 For representative commentary on Seider's possible unconstitutionality, see Stein, supra
note 4; In Search of a Rationale, supra note 5.
84 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967), reargumnent denied, 21
N.Y 2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968).
3521 N.Y.2d at 310, 234 N.E.2d at 671, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 636 (citation omitted).
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It is especially significant that the court went on to declare that recovery
was limited to the value of the asset attached-the face value of the policy.
Judge Fuld, writing for the majority, offered policy reasons for uphold-
ing Seider. He noted that the historical limitations and rigid tests for
in personam and in rem jurisdiction were "giving way to a more realistic
and reasonable evaluation of the respective rights [of the parties] in terms
of fairness. '36 In reality, the insurer was in full control of the defense;
it selected the attorney, decided settlements, and made procedural decisions.
The state had sufficient relation to the controversy when the insurer was
being regulated by the state and the plaintiff was a New York resident
(this reference to the New York residency requirement was later found
essential to Seider-type actions). Fairness and public policy were not vio-
lated if insurance policy attachment was permitted. But the majority rec-
ognized that some problems inherent in Seider were not yet solved. The
court recommended that the Law Revision Committee and the Advisory
Committee of the Judicial Conference conduct studies into the impact of
such quasi in rem jurisdiction, but stated that until such studies could estab-
lish the relationship of quasi in rem jurisdiction and the rule of forum
non conveniens, Seider would stand. 7
Judge Keating concurred in Simpson, for it was his belief that since
there were sufficient state interests present to support a direct tction law
if one were authorized by the legislature, there were also sufficient interests
to sustain a Seider-type attachment. Since the insurance company was
present and was the real party in interest, there were sufficient contacts
with New York to grant jurisdiction.3 8
Simpson, however, was not a strong mandate for the continuance of the
Seider rule in New York. Significantly, Seider was upheld because Judge
Breitel, a new appointee to the court, voted to continue such attachment al-
though he felt that Seider was wrong and that the insurance policy was
contingent and not intended to be reached by the attachment statute.
Worse yet, he feared New York, already a "mecca for those seeking high
verdicts in personal injury cases,"a would be subject to a proliferation of
suits since practically any plaintiff could come to New York and sue by at-
tachment simply because most insurance companies have offices in New
York. Judge Breitel was more concerned with the court's stability than
with one "tolerable error." The votes of Judge Breitel and Judge Bergan,
who concurred in Breitel's opinion, were decisive in upholding Seider. Had
they voted with the two dissenters, Seider would have been overruled.
Judge Brietel's fear of high recoveries by non-residents seems somewhat
36Id. at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
37 Id. at 312, 234 N.E.2d at 672-73, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
881d at 313-14, 234 N.E.2d at 673, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
391d. at 316, 234 NXE.2d at 675, 287 N.Y.S.2d. at 641.
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unfounded since Simpson allows recovery only to the face value of the
policy. Plaintiffs would know that their potential recovery could be lower
than if they sued in personam in another jurisdiction. Limiting the re-
covery could actually deter New York residents from suing in their home
state, because by bringing an action elsewhere there is at least a possibility
of a higher recovery. This deterrent effect might be negligible, however,
because in most cases an extremely solvent defendant will have more than
sufficient insurance coverage, such that an in personam action would be
unnecessary to recovery of a large amount. Conversely, a defendant with
only modest coverage would be unlikely to have sufficient personal assets
to make collectible a judgment in excess of his insurance limits. But a
significant shortcoming of the first Simpson opinion is its failure to spe-
cifically state that non-resident plaintiffs could not avail themselves of the
Seider procedure, although this is implicit in the majority opinion. Not un-
til its denial of reargument did the court make this limitation explicit.4"
In a very thorough dissent to the first Simpson opinion,41 Judge Burke
cast his doubts upon the Seider doctrine; he believed not only that was
there was no attachable debt, but that Seider did not comply with the mod-
ern trend toward de-emphasizing the value of quasi in rem actions. Addi-
tionally, he considered Seider untenable because the mere presence of the
insurer in the state was not sufficient to meet the jurisdictional require-
ments of Watson v. Employers Liability Corp.42 In Watson the United
States Supreme Court held that when an accident occurs within a state,
there is sufficient state interest in seeing that the plaintiff is compensated
for his injuries to justify a statute permitting suit directly against the in-
surance company, and the Court indicated that a plaintiff could sue an in-
surer directly if it had issued a policy within the forum state to the person
who allegedly caused the injury. Judge Burk believed that these contacts
with the state were necessary to allow the state to alter the nature of the
insurance contract and were not specifically met in Simpson. He also be-
lieved that it was unfair to provide plaintiffs with venue at their conven-
ience without any regard for the convenience of defendants or the presence
of witnesses within the jurisdiction. This unfairness, along with a lack of
contacts with the forum state, appeared to Judge Burke to render the Seider
doctrine unconstitutional.
Judge Burke's feeling that Seider would generally create unfair results
was manifested in Victor v. Lyon Associates, Inc.43 In Victor, as in Seider
and Simpson, the plaintiff was a New York resident and the defendant's
liability carrier was doing business in New York. The defendant here was
40 Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968).
4121 N.Y.2d at 317, 234 N.E.2d at 676, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 642-43. (Burke, J., dissenting).
42 348 U.S, 66 (1954). In Watson, the Court upheld Louisiana's direct action statute.
4321 N.Y.2d 695, 234 N.E.2d 459, 287 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1967), appeal dismissed sub
no=., Hanover Ins. Co. v. Victor, 393 U.S. 7, -rehearing denied, 393 U.S. 671 (1968).
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a Maryland corporation which did not conduct business in New York, and
the claim arose from an accident which had occurred in South Viet Nam."
Attachment of the insurance policy in New York was permitted. There
are few contacts with New York, and there would be hardship in trans-
ferring witnesses to the forum state. But despite these difficulties and re-
gardless of intense criticism of Victor,45 it is incorrect to say that it is the
Seider doctrine which causes an unfair result. If, for example, the de-
fendant had owned real estate in New York, the attachment would have
been permitted although witnesses and possibly other parties would still
have had to travel the great distance to New York. The nature of quasi
in rem jurisdiction itself produces this arguably inequitable outcome.
Whatever the type of "property" attached, the inconveniences remain.
For a time it appeared that defendants objecting to attachment of their
insurance policies could gain relief by removing the case to a federal dis-
trict court.4 6  In Podolsky v. Devinney, 7 decided by the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of New York, a New York plaintiff attached
the policy of a New Jersey defendant after an accident in New Jersey.
The defendant removed the case to the federal court, where the insurance
company complained that since New York does not allow a limited appear-
ance,48 the insurance company would be subject to possible default judg-
ment and thereby lose its property without any chance to defend because
the insured (thp named defendant) might not authorize the insurer to ap-
pear on his behalf. The court vacated the attachment and held it to be
unqonstitutional.
44 Under the traditional view, when an accident occurs in a foreign country a plaintiff can
acquire personal jurisdiction over an individual defendant in the state of his domicile and over
a corporation in the state of its incorporation or in any state in which it is doing business. Stein,
supra note 4, at 1116 n.281.
45 Professor Stein states:
Utilizing the doctrines of fairness and reasonableness and focusing upon the nexus
between the forum, on the one hand, and the parties and the underlying transaction
on the other, one may conclude that the New York courts lacked jurisdiction....
Aside from the plaintiff's domicile in the state and the fortuitous presence of the insurer
there, various factors . . . militate against jurisdiction in New York. The intangible
policy obligations were not in that state by the voluntary choice of the insured; other
forums existed in which the controversy could have been fully adjudicated; it was likely
that the law of another state would have been applicable; and New York's assumption
of jurisdiction may have created a risk of multiple liability. The availability of evidence
and the expectations of the parties as to the place of suit also pointed to jurisdictions
other than New York. Moreover, New York and the defendant's "property" therein
had no connection with the transaction or occurrence which gave rise to the suit.
Id. at 1116-17.
46 Removal based on diversity of citizenship is provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1970):
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought
in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdic-
tion, may be removed by the defendant . . . to the district and division embracing
the place where such action is pending.
47 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
4sNYCPLR § 320 (McKinney 1972).
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As a basis for its decision, the court first decided that insurance poli-
cies were not simple debts as in Harris v. Balk.49 It noted that the "situs"
of the res (insurance policy) was not only New York, but also any other
state where the company did business. In contrast, Harris had established
that the situs of the debt is wherever the debtor happens to be, and thus
it can exist in only one place at a time. Under Seider, the same debt
could be located in different states simultaneously if other states were to
permit insurance policy attachment. 50 Second the court emphasized the
contingent aspect of insurance policies; the duty to defend does not arise
until jurisdiction is obtained, and the obligation to indemnify does not
arise until a judgment is entered. This was the same point emphasized
by Judge Burke in his Seider dissent. The court also noted that the obliga-
tion to defend was in reality an important right of the insurance company
and was essential to enable the company to protect its financial interests.
This "debt," by the court's interpretation, was more a benefit to the insurer
than an obligation to the insured. Finally the Podolsky opinion expressed
the fear that attachment could deprive the insurance company of its prop-
erty without any showing of liability of the defendant-the defendant
would not appear and default would be granted. And if the insured did
appear, he could be subject to a judgment exceeding the policy limits,"'
since special appearances were not permitted in New York. The overall
effect was to force the insured to submit to personal jurisdiction 'when
no basis for such jurisdiction existed, and this seemed to the court to violate
due process of law. 52
Podolsky was decided after the first Simpson, v. Loehmann decision.
But two months after Podolsky, the Court of Appeals of New York in
a per curiam opinion denying reargument of Simpson53 emphasized that,
contrary to the Podolsky interpretation of Seider, there could be no re-
49 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
50 In Podolsky, the court stated:
The concept of quasi in rem jurisdiction is based on the physical power of the
state with regard to the res or thing attached. As such it must be recognized that
the authority of any tribunal is necessarily restricted by the- territorial limits of the
State in which it is functioning.
281 F. Supp. at 493-94 (citations omitted).
51 The court seemed to disregard the Simpson limitation that recovery may not exceed
the policy limits.
52 The court stated:
It is settled that at the present state of development in American law an attempt
to obtain in personam jurisdiction over the present defendants would not comport with
due process even if the New York statutes purported to allow it. That conclusion fol-
lows from the fact that the only nexus this litigation has with New York is the plain-
tiff's residence.
281 F. Supp. at 496. The court also cited Victor as an example where factors including
witnesses and hospitalization make another forum the one with the sufficient minimum contacts
required by due process to serve notions of fair play and substantial justice. Id.
5321 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968).
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covery in excess of the policy amount even if the defendant personally
defended on the merits.
Barker v. Smith,54 was a diversity action resulting from an accident
in Michigan between a New York plaintiff and a Michigan corporate defen-
dant insured by a company doing business in New York. The plaintiff
had received medical treatment in New York. The court held that New
York law applied and that the policy was an attachable debt. With re-
spect to claimed constitutional violations, the court found nothing that
forces a state ". . . to subordinate its own principles to those of the state
where the contract was executed and the accident occurred."55  Citing Wat-
son v. Employers Liability Corp.,-" the court reasoned that the New York
resident had enough interest in the defendant's insurance policy to "warrant
the remedies afforded by [the policy." Since the plaintiff's medical ex-
penses were to be compensated by the defendant's policy, and the company
was doing business in New York, there were enough "activities relating
to the contract" in New York to provide a basis for treating the obligation
of the insurance company as an attachable debt. New York's interest in
protecting and possibly having to provide free medical care for its citizens
was another factor influencing the result. Furthermore, the state's attach-
'ment procedure was not as drastic as it might appear since the insurer
would control the litigation wherever the action was brought, and any
hardships could be surmounted by a motion for a change of venue pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1404.17  Finally the court noted that Podolsky was not
determinative of Barker because of the second Simpson opinion, although
some constitutional questions remained to be solved.58  Thus the Barker
decision, while not completely answering all the objections to Seider, at
least clarified the doctrine and indicated that Podolsky would not be fol-
lowed.
Shortly after Barker, the Seider doctrine received grudging support by
54290 F. Supp. 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
551d. at 713.
56 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
57 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a) (1970) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in
the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or di-
vision where it might have been brought."
58 The court said:
There remains the risk that the insured . . . might, contrary to its obligations under
the policy, refuse assistance to the insurer (Mutual). In such event, unless recovery
were denied on the ground that the insured had failed to comply with the policy's
terms, a default judgment might be entered entitling the plaintiff ... to recover from
Mutual even though the issue of liability was never litigated and the policy entitled
Mutual to assert the insured's default as against it. Such a consequence would work
a far greater hardship on Mutual than would adoption of a direct action statute per-
mitring it to litigate the question of liability.
290 F. Supp. at 714-15 (citations omitted). See Note, Direct-Action Statutes: Their Operational
and Conflicts-of-Laws Problems, 74 HARV. L. REv. 357, 365-66 (1960).,
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a federal district court in Jarvick v. Magic Mountain Corp. 9 The facts
were typically Seider and involved a Vermont defendant. Judge McLean
believed that Simpson had changed New York law sufficiently to eliminate
any due process violations and, therefore, the Seider rule was not so clearly
wrong as to excuse the court from following it. The court then granted
the defendant's motion to transfer the action to Vermont, where the de-
fendant had agreed (perhaps unnecessarily) to appear generally.6"
Perhaps the most conclusive affirmation of the Seider doctrine came
from the Second Circuit in a 1968 case, Minichiello v. Rosenberg., De-
fendant Rosenberg, a Pennsylvania resident who allegedly caused an acci-
dent in Pennsylvania had sought dismissal of the attachment in New York
of his insurance policy. His insurer was doing business in New York and
the plaintiff was a New York resident. Judge Friendly read Simpson v.
Loehmann62 to sanction a judicially created direct action against the insurer
by attachment. He reasoned that if the New York legislature could con-
stitutionally create a direct action for a New York resident injured in an-
other state, then the Seider rule would be tenable. After examining Wat-
son v. Employer's Liability Corp. 3 and noting the policy reasons for
permitting a plaintiff to sue in his home state," he concluded that the
59 290 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
60 Transfer of a diversity action begun by a Seider-type attachment, as in Jarvick, presents
an interesting problem. Could the court transfer an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a) (1970)
even though the defendant did not agree to appear generally? And if so, what form would
that action take? A transfer is proper only to a forum where the action could have been brought,
Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960), and since the plaintiff could not bring an attachment
action against an insurance policy in any state but New York, transfer would be improper if
the quasi in rem action was to be maintained. Of course, an in personam action could have
been brought in certain other forums. But a defendant cannot accomplish transfer by waiving
the § 1404 (a) restriction that the action, if not possible initially in that forum, could not
be transferred there. Id. Would it be improper to transfer a quasi in rem action in a New
York federal court to another federal court as an in personam action? Probably nor, as long
as it was transferred to a district where personal jurisdiction was obtainable, because the right
to sue in the other forum need not be an unqualified right. The appropriateness of an action
in personam in another jurisdiction would be sufficient to allow transfer there, for the plaintiff
could not object to the transfer by saying that he would not have personally served the defen-
dant there. But cf. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
However, the defendant might prefer not to seek transfer because he is assured that in New
York he will not be subject to liability in excess of his policy coverage. Yet as a result the case
would be tried in New York even though New York was the least convenient forum. But if
transfer is routinely sought and allowed, the attachment procedure would be rendered useless
(except perhaps to toll the statute of limitations), and the procedural steps would be needlessly
increased. Note that if plaintiff's Seider.type actions are always transferred, then the procedure
would exist in name only, and such actions would cease. In the meantime, plaintiffs who were
not aware that the transfer out of New York was becoming automatic would be burdened with
transfer procedures.
61410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844, rehearing denied, 396 U.S.
949 (1969).
82 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
348 U.S. 66 (1954).
64 A policy consideration is that the injury may require treatment in hospitals of the
plaintiff's state, which might mean state aid. In Minichiello the court noted the trend away
19731 NOTES
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
United States Supreme Court would uphold a New York statute allowing
a direct action against insurance companies doing business in New York
by residents of that state as well as by persons injured there.65
However, Judge Friendly reasoned that even if a direct action statute
would be constitutional, Seider could still fail because it involved both
a non-resident insured as a defendant and the insurance company, whereas
the typical direct action statute permitted suit against the insurance com-
pany without making the actual tortfeasor a party to the action. But since
the insurer was the true defendant in either situation, the difference was
not considered critical. As a more significant problem, he questioned the
constitutionality of a direct action where the state was neither the plaintiff's
residence nor the place of injury. He concluded that since the insurance
company is present in New York, recovery is restricted to the policy limits,
and the remedy is reserved for New York residents, there are no due proc-
ess violations.66 Finally, Judge Friendly noted that even if recovery was
limited to the policy value, the problem might remain whether the New
York judgment would have collateral estoppel effect in other forums, al-
though it probably would not.6 No state could give collateral estoppel
effect to a Seider judgment because the insurer, not the insured, would con-
trol the defense; the procedure, after all, was a direct action against the
insurer. The non-resident defendant would not have full opportunity to
defend in the sense required for collateral estoppel.
Although many of the constitutional objections against Seider-type at-
tachments had been answered, a dissenting opinion in Minichiello68 evi-
denced the strong feeling that Seider was nevertheless wrong. Judge An-
derson emphasized that many policy reasons work against suits in the plain-
tiff's state. For example, accident deterrence goals and medical treatment
factors would be related to the state of the injury, not New York. Sig-
nificantly, Judge Anderson read Wfatson to say that a prerequisite to a
valid direct action law is the occurrence of the injury in the plaintiff's
state. Where the plaintiff is allowed to sue in his own state, all the con-
veniences accrue to him, and none to the defendant. Judge Anderson
thought it particularly unfair to require a defendant who had not com-
mitted a tort in New York to go there to defend. This was especially
true when the plaintiff was in the defendant's state at the time of the
injury. Judge Anderson indicated that convenience of the forum was the
from bias toward the defendant in obtaining personal jurisdiction and recognized that more
frequently the defendant is required to go to the plaintiff's state if there is a sufficient basis
for requiring it. 410 F.2d at 110.
65 For a discussion of direct action statutes, see Note, Direct-Action Statutes: Their Opera-
tional and Conflicts-of-Laws Problems, 74 HARV. L. REv. 357 (1960).
66410 F.2d at 113.
67 The court recognized that the due process clause prevents a state from giving a quasi
in rem judgment collateral estoppel effect. Id. at 112.
681d. at 113 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
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primary consideration. The fortuitous presence of the defendant's insur-
ance company within the plaintiff's state carried little weight in that deter-
mination. Thus under a true direct action statute as viewed by Judge
Anderson, the Seider result would not be reached because an action had
to be brought in the state where the accident occurred. The Seider varia-
tion of a direct action statute was unreasonable and parochial. In retalia-
tion other states might adopt the rule and the result would be a contest
between states seeking to protect their own citizens. In Judge Anderson's
opinion, the Seider process was unconstitutional. 9
After reconsideration of Minichiello en banc, the Second Circuit ad-
hered to its, prior affirmation of Seider.0  Relying on Harris v. Balk, 1
the court rejected the contention that the burden on non-resident defen-
dants was too great. Seider meant only that ". . . liability policies, on
which appellants could not have realized for any purpose other than to
protect themselves against losses to others, will be applied to the very
objectives for which they were procured." '" Further, protection against
an inconvenient forum was provided by the possibility of transfer of venue.
The fact that such transfer might not always be permitted would prove
that there were other factors relevant to convenience besides the place
of the injury. Yet the Minichiello court indicated that problems with
Seider still remained, especially in cases involving multiple claims. Seider
could produce unconstitutional results if it was applied to give preference
to one claimant in a multiple claim situation when, with other claims, the
amount sought would exceed policy limits. The court suggested that be-
fore other states adopt the Seider rule, they should examine all the poten-
tial difficulties.73
After Minichiello it was fairly well settled that Seider was constitu-
tional because there were sufficient contacts with the forum, suits were
limited to residents of New York, and recovery was limited to the policy
amount.74 But in 1970 Seider was expanded to encompass suit by a non-
69 Id. at 117.
70Id. at 118.
71198 U.S. 215 (1905).
72 410 F.2d at 118.
73 The court seems to be warning other states that Seider may not be worth the trouble.
Yet in a multiple claimant situation, a defendant will almost always face a possible judgment
exceeding his policy coverage. At least the Seider defendant in New York will not be personally
liable there no matter how many claimants there are. As to possible prejudice against
the claimants, the first to attach would acquire jurisdiction to recover through the insurance
policy. In any multiple claimant-quasi in rem action there is possibility of prejudice to other
creditors; it is not a result peculiar to Seider-type actions.
7 4 See Ferrall v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 840 (1970); Vaage v. Lewis, 29 App. Div. 2d 315, 288 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct.
1968). In Farrell, New York administrators of a non-resident decedents estate were not
permitted to use the Seider attachment procedure. The Seider doctrine, which protects New
York dtizens, was, found to be inapplicable to administrators not representing a resident-
decreased.
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resident plaintiff. In McHugh v. Paley,7' a case with exceptional circum-
stances, the plaintiff was a Massachusetts resident injured in the Bahamas,
allegedly by the negligence of a defendant-employee who was an English
citizen residing in the Bahamas. The employer-defendant was a New York
resident, and suit was initiated by personal service on him. Subsequently
the insurance policy covering the employer and his employee was attached.
This was done to acquire jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant-em-
ployee because otherwise the resident defendant, who was not the actual
tortfeasor, would be greatly hindered in his defense. New York could
not assert in personam jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant. The
court found that the Seider rule that the claimant must be a New York
resident need not be strictly applied because the non-resident defendant
was the agent of the New York defendant, and that quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion over the employee was properly obtained. The court did not deny
that it was applying a broad view of Seider but justified its view on "logic,
reason, and the human equation."76  A narrow construction of Seider
would have resulted in injustice since it was necessary that the actual tort-
feasor be a party, and to send the action to the Bahamas would be impracti-
cal since the plaintiff was a welfare recipient confined to a Massachusetts
hospital.
The court viewed the Seider rule as settled and apparently out of dan-
ger:
The court is aware that in adopting this enlightened interpretation of the
law, the principle of Seider v. Roth may be expanded. However, to truly
administer justice in the exceptional circumstances at hand, the court
should not be limited by a rigid, circumscribed and narrow application of
the old Seider rule to a new situationj 7
The "old" Seider rule had been criticized as perhaps allowing such expan-
sion. For a rule already resting on the outer fringes of due process, an
expansion makes the procedure even more questionable. The courts up-
holding Seider had repeatedly emphasized that the stated limits were es-
sential to its validity. It is strange that the court in McHugh felt so free
to expand a rule which had such tenuous acceptance and which was the
subject of almost as much dissent as approval.
The problem in McHugh may be stated thus: Does an out-of-state
plaintiff, by achieving in personam jurisdiction over a resident-defendant,
thereby achieve the power to attach that defendant's insurance policy in
order to obtain quasi in rem jurisidiction over a non-resident who is also
covered by that policy because of his agency status? Once personal juris-
diction is established (or even before) there seems to be no reason why
7563 Misc. 2d 1092, 314 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
76Id. at 1095, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 212.
77id., 314 N.Y.S.2d at 213.
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a New York defendant's insurance policy could not be attached in New
York by a non-resident plaintiff; the objection to the Seider rule that it
is unfair to require a person to come to New York to defend an action
by a non-resident solely because his insurance company does business there
is inapplicable if the defendant is already a New York resident. There-
fore, such attachment is proper, and the incidental (though intended) ef-
fect of achieving jurisdiction over a defendant-employee who is a non-
resident should not be objectionable. Just as in other Seider-type actions,
the non-resident defendant must travel to New York to defend. The req-
uisite nexus with New York is provided through the defendant-employer's
insurance policy; the insurer is the real defendant.
The court in McHugh decided that since the New York defendant's
potential liability was created by virtue of the non-resident's actions, the
connection was sufficient to avoid dismissal. But it stated that if the action
by attachment was against the non-resident defendant alone, dismissal
would be required.7S One commentator has approved this result:
In view of these peculiar facts [that it was practically impossible for the
plaintiff to sue anywhere but New York] New York probably had suffi-
cient interest in the case to avoid constitutional problems, in particular
since the 1969 amendment to Rule 320 of the Civil Practice Law and
Rules enable [sic] the defendant to defend the case on the merits without
subjecting himself to in personam jurisdiction.79
Thus, within relatively clear boundaries, Seider v. Roth continues to be
law in New York. Its recurring theme is that the insurance company is
the real party in interest.
III. Is SOMETHING WRONG WITH SEIDER?
The- Seider doctrine is still very much open to discussion. Not only
is there continuing criticism of it in New York, but there is widespread
dissatisfaction with it throughout the legal profession and in other states.80
A. Sufficient State Interest and Due Proces
Many of the problems with Seider involve constitutional issues. One
serious question, recognized by both the majority and dissent in Minichiello
v. Rosenberg,81 is whether the forum state has enough "interest" in the
insurance relationship to enable it to exercise jurisdiction.8 2 Disadvantages
to the defendant may overshadow New York's interest in protecting its
resident-plaintiffs. For example a non-resident defendant might have to
78 Id., 314 N.Y.S.2d at 212.
76Herzog, Conflicts of Laws, 22 SYR. L. REv. 363 (1971).
8o See articles dted note 23 supra.
81410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968).
82 5tein, supra note 4, at 1107.
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travel a great distance and suffer financial hardship to defend in New
York. Quite simply, the plaintiff is given an extra forum, whereby he
may use the procedural benefits of his home stateY3 It has been argued
that this increase in the number of forums in which the plaintiff may sue
could undermine the process by which insurers calculate their premiums,
because the calculations are based on average recoveries in selected juris-
dictions where the insurer can expect to defend. 4 However, as long as
only three states have allowed insurance policy attachment, the number of
cases using that procedure would probably be so small as to be statistically
insignificant. And if many states permit such attachment, it would not
be difficult for insurance companies to adjust their calculations to accommo-
date the increased number of potential forums.
Direct action statutes have been upheld where due process standards,
measured by the sufficiency of the state's interest, were met. The insurance
company must have enough contacts with the state, the accident, and the
parties, to subject it to the state policies which in reality rewrite the in-
surance contract.8 The Seider line of cases has been recognized as pro-
viding a limited direct action against the insurance company because the
insured is, in reality, only a conduit named as a defendant in order to
provide a conceptual basis for reaching the insurer.86
In determining the presence of sufficient state interest to allow this
contractual alteration, a court may permissibly apply standards less strin-
gent than those for in personam jurisdiction, since traditionally quasi in
rem jurisdiction is an alternative, limited remedy when in personam juris-
diction cannot be obtained.87 But there is an additional question whether
a state can alter a contract made outside the state to permit a quasi in rem
"direct action" without first meeting the Watson requirement that the acci-
dent must have occurred within the state seeking to alter the contract.
88
In Watson the Court found that Louisiana's interest in protecting per-
sons injured in the state justified a direct action against the insurer rather
83Id. at 1106.
84 Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and the Interstate Corpora-
tion, 67 COLUM. L. REV, 550, 556 (1967). Normally, the company would expect suit in
one of two places-the place of the accident or the defendant's domicile. Personal service
wherever the defendant can be found is also possible. Nevertheless, Seider does widen the
range of forums. See NYCPLR § 302(a) (2) (McKinney 1972); Millikan v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457, 464 (1940); von Mehren & Traurman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1137 (1966).
85 Insurance policies generally require judgment to be entered against the defendant before
the company may be sued for payment. Watson v. Employers Liab. Corp., 348 U.S. 66,
68 (1954).
86 Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1968).
8 7 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). But cf. Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.
2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957).
8 8 See In Search of a Rationale, supra note 5, at 417-18; WISC. STAT. ANN. § 260_.11
(Supp 1968); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22: 655 (West 1959).
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than suit against the actual tortfeasor who might be a great distance from
Louisiana and who could not be served within the state. 9 In Seider the
plaintiff was not injured in New York, so one important factor necessary
for a direct action in Watson is not present. Also, Louisiana was pro-
tecting not only its own residents but anyone injured in the state. New
York, through the Seider doctrine, protects only its residents injured outside
the state unless extraordinary circumstances as in McHugh are present.
Nevertheless, a New York resident could return to his home state for
treatment, which would help to support an analogous argument; in such
situations New York's interest that its citizens receive proper medical care
is similar to the interest protected in Watson.0 Minichiello, for example,
concluded that New York as well as the state where the injury occurred
had an interest in seeing that the plaintiff received adequate care without
the necessity of the state's paying for it.
If the only due process requirement is the state interest of ensuring
that its residents are compensated by insurance companies to avoid public
expense, then the Seider process creates no more due process problems
than does the typical direct action statute. This self-interest requirement
would also justify prohibiting non-residents from using a Seider-type pro-
cedure: the accident did not occur within the forum state, and more likely
than not the state would not have to pay a non-resident's bills:
But there is more to the Watson standard. A significant characteristic
of Seider-type actions distinguishes them from the Louisiana experience.
In Louisiana there is no need to consider whether the defendant-insurance
company is "doing business" within the state because jurisdiction is based
upon the tortious act being committed there. However in Seider-type ac-
tions the presence of the defendant's insurer, the only basis for jurisdic-
tion, is wholly fortuitous. The question. that must be answered is whether
there is any constitutional distinction between permitting an action against
an insurance company which is sued because its insured allegedly com-
mitted a tort within the state and permitting a quasi in rem action against
an insurer because it does business in the plaintiff's state although the
alleged tort occurred elsewhere.
Because there are less stringent standards for quasi in rem actions, New
York is probably correct in concluding that its interest in protecting resi-
dents, complemented by the presence of the insurance company subject
to state regulation, provides a substantial and continuing relation to the
controversy sufficient to satisfy due process requirements for quasi in rem
89 The corporation from which the harmful product was purchased could not be sued
in Louisiana because it had no agent to accept process there. Some long-arm statutes do
not reach a foreign corporation whose defective product caused injury in a state where the
company conducted no business.
9 This is exactly what happened in Barker v. Smith, 290 F. Supp. 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
where the plaintiff was injured in Michigan, but returned to New York for treatment.
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jurisdiction.9' Long-arm statutes protect persons injured in New York; 2
Seider-type attachment protects New York citizens injured away from their
state.
Ironically, a state's desire to protect its resident-plaintiffs by declar-
ing that an insurance policy obligation is not contingent after an accident
has occurred could create an unintended result. It has been suggested
that if, for example, a New York plaintiff sued a non-resident defendant
in the state where the tort was committed, achieving personal jurisdiction,
the insurance obligation of the defendant would become an attachable debt
in New York when the suit was begun. Then, before a personal judgment
could be rendered the policy could be attached in New York by a creditor
of the defendant, and the proceeds could be paid to this creditor. When
the New York tort victim obtained judgment against the defendant, the
proceeds would no longer be available to the victim.9 3 But this creditor at-
tachment seems unlikely, especially since the amount of payable policy
proceeds would not be known until the tort judgment was entered.
Also, as the cases have pointed out, insurance companies are placed
in a difficult position. Although the defendant could not be liable in
excess of the policy coverage, the great distance which he might have to
travel could discourage his appearance. The insurer is thereby subject to
possible hardship in its defense, although default need not occur since -the
insurer could defend alone, assuming permission from the insured to do
so either is not required or is granted. However, the insurer could also
disclaim liability by alleging lack of cooperation by the actual tortfeasor,9 4
even though the defendant's refusal to cooperate might be justified by the
very reason that personal jurisdiction could not be had over him, due to a
lack of sufficient contacts with the forum state, and that requiring him to
appear would be a hardship. 5 It is difficult to understand how it fairly
serves state policy to subject insurance companies and individuals to such
problems, despite benefits to its own citizens.
91 See Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 110 ( d Cir. 1968); Simpson v. Loehmann,
21 N.Y.2d 305, 311, 234 N.E.2d 669, 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 637 (1967).
9 2 See NYCPLR § 302(a) (McKinney 1972).
93 A general creditor would have priority under NYCPLR § 5234(b) (McKinney 1963)
if the attachment was made prior to judgment against the insured. Comment, Quasi in
Rem Jurisdiction Based on insurer's Obligations, 19 STAN. L. REV. 654, 658-59 (1967).
94 Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and the Interstate Corpora-
tion, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 550, 556 (1967). This problem was thought to have been solved
by Simpson; because the defendant cannot be held personally liable and recovery is limited
to the policy limits, there is less reason for a defendant to fear coming to New York. However,
it must be recognized that the possibility of lengthy travel alone would deter the defendant
from appearing.
95 See In Search of a Rationale, supra note 5, at 416.
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B. Seider and the Contingent Liability Problem
Fundamental to Seider and liability insurance attachment was the de-
termination not only that the policy is a debt within the statute permitting
attachment, but also that the debt is fixed and not dependent upon a con-
tingency. 6  New York's conclusion was that once the accident occurred,
the duty to defend and the obligations to pay medical expenses and to
investigate were fixed. At that point the insurer's obligation was no longer
considered conditional.
Disagreement as to valuation continues to complicate this contingency
issue, even though the question was directly faced in Simpson v.
Loehmann: the policy limit is the value of the obligation attached. Before
Simpson, scholars indicated that the only "debt" was the obligation to de-
fend, and it would be reasonable to consider the cost of the defense as
the only recoverable amount because only the obligation to defend was
fixed prior to judgment. If a default judgment were entered, this amount
would be difficult to determine where no defense was made. 7  Where
the attachment was made and judgment entered for the plaintiff, the in-
surer could contend that there was no longer an obligation to indemnify."
This unlikely result is at least arguable because these is authority9 that
where a debt is partly unconditional (absolute duty to defend) and partly
conditional (duty to indemnify only if liability is found), only the uncondi-
tional party may be attached."" As a further complication, although there
is no real dispute that the obligation to pay initial medical payments to
the defendant is fixed, the obligation to investigate is discretionary and
not a money debt. Regardless, New York established that there was suffi-
cient basis for attachment because the contractual obligation to defend and
ifidemnify was a debt,'01 even if indemnity was found not to be necessary.
New York's characterization of the policy obligation as a non-contin-
gent debt is not untenable. The insurance company's obligation to defend
does not really depend upon the existence of jurisdiction over the parties.
It requires only that an action be brought by filing a complaint. The
96 Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
97 In Stein, supra note 4, at 1125, Professor Stein states:
One solution might be to award the probable attorney's fees for the defense; however,
this would create further difficulties in determining such factors as the probable length
of the trial, the cost to procure attendance of parties and witnesses .... Alternatively,
the amount of policy premiums might be used for satisfaction, but this . . . fails to
consider that the premium purchases coverage and does not reflect in any respect the
actual value of the obligation to defend.
98Id. at 1126.
99 See Herman & Grace v. City of New York, 130 App. Div. 531, 114 N.Y.S. 1107
(Sup. Ct. 1909), aff'd mem., 119 N.Y. 600, 93 N.E. 376 (1910); cf. Sheehy v. Madison
Square Garden Corp., 266 N.Y. 44, 193 N.E. 633 (1934).
10 0 Comment, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction Based on Insurer's Obligations, 19 STAN. L
REV. 654, 657 (1967).
1o Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
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obligation to pay for any liability exists from the time of the accident.
A debtor-creditor relationship has been established, and the litigation will
determine whether the insurer must indemnify. Since there is an obliga-
tion (even if unfixed in amount), the other problems can be settled in
litigation." 2 As a further argument, it has been suggested that after the
accident has occurred the obligation to the insured might be assignable,
whereas before the accident it would not. Since the insurer undertakes
a given risk with an individual, assignment prior to an accident is not
proper. However, after the accident, which the insurer had "bargained
would not happen, the insurer's obligation to the insured has become a
chose in action, which has the characteristics of attachable property. As-
signment no longer interferes with the personal relationship and the as-
sumed risk."0 3 This result seems highly inprobable, however, because the
value of the obligation is still uncertain until litigation determines the
amount to which the injured plaintiff is entitled. And assignment would
interfere with the personal relationship between the defendant and his
insurance company. Only the right to payment wotild be assignable.
Another argument which supports the New York view is that other
states have recognized that for purposes of ancillary administration an in-
surer's obligation to defend and indemnify is a debt. The objective of
such administration is to allow the plaintiff to commence or continue his
action after the original defendant's death, and to provide a forum where
he may do so." This would be true even when the intended defendant
dies before being personally served. When a jury can determine the pol-
icy value, the policy is an existing and present debt. Fire and burglary
policies have been found attachable on this theory.0 5 However, the Seider
line of cases provides a plaintiff with a new forum, whereas the ancillary
administration cases only substitute defendants in a suit which could have
been brought initially only in the jurisdiction where ancillary administra-
tion was sought."0 6 In Riggle, as explained in the Seider dissent,0 7 juris-
diction had been obtained over the defendant before death. This meant
there was property in New York because the obligation to defend had
102 51 MrNN. L. REV. 158, 160-62 (1966). See Fishman v. Sanders, 15 N.Y.2d 298j
206 N.E.2d 326, 258 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1965) (dictum); Goldberg v. Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins.
Co., 297 N.Y. 148, 77 N.E.2d 131 (1948); 7A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANcI LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 4683 (1962); Note, The Insurer's Duty to Defend Under a Liability Insurance Policy, 114
U. PA. L, REV. 734 (1966). But see Ricker v. Lajoie, 314 F. Supt,. 401 (D, Vt. 1970);
Howard v. Allen, 254 S.C. 455, 176 S.E.2d 127 (1970).
103 51 MINN. L. REV. 158, 163 (1966).
'
0 4 See Furst v. Brady, 375 Il. 425, 31 N.E.2d 606 (1940); Liberty v. Kinney 242
Iowa 656, 47 N.W.2d 835 (1951); Gordon v. Shea, 300 Mass. 95, 14 N.E.2d 105 (1938);
Robinson v. Carroll, 87 N.H. 114, 174 A. 772 (1934). New York relied principally upon
Matter of Riggle's Estate, 11 N.Y.2d 73, 181 N.E. 436, 226 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962).
105 51 MINN. L. REV. 158, 160 (1966).
106 Stein, supra note 4, at 411.
10 7 17 N.Y.2d at 116, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103 (Burke, J., dissenting).
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vested, and the appointment of an ancillary administrator only provided
a substituted defendant for that property. Nevertheless, it is a logical
extension of the estate administration cases that a liability policy is truly
property.
C. Res Judicata and Multiple Liability
Generally, a judgment that will not protect a defendant from double
liability is void. In a Seider-type attachment action, if the plaintiff wins
on the merits and recovers to the extent of the defendant's insurance policy,
then the insurer's obligation is satisfied. If the plaintiff were then to initi-
ate proceedings against the defendant in another state where personal juris-
diction could be obtained, the defendant would be forced to defend without
the benefit of his insurance policy. Although a judgment quasi in rem
is conclusive as to all interests in the attached property, such judgment
does not preclude another action.108
The question then becomes whether it is unfair or perhaps unconstitu-
tional to subject a defendant to quasi in rem jurisdiction through attach-
ment of his insurance policy, and then to in personam jurisdiction without
the benefit of this policy. There is a potential for harassment of a de-
fendant, as well as for multiplicity of actions, which is inconsistent with
modern jurisdictional considerations of fair play and finality. Incon-
venience is also an important factor in determining -whether due process
standards are met.' At the very least, the plaintiff's bargaining power
in the first action would be increased,"" and conceivably the plaintiff could
force a settlement in excess of the policy limits by threatening to sue in
personam in another state; the effect would be the same as a personal
judgment even though there are not enough contacts with the forum state
to permit in personam jurisdiction. The insurer would be obligated to
advise the defendant that it might be to his advantage to-settle part of the
claim out of his own pocket rather than be subject to a larger recovery later.
Nevertheless, factors that influence the plaintiff in choosing to sue in
his homle state and to utilize quasi in rem procedure would usually deter the
plaintiff from later suing elsewhere. If the plaintiff sues in his home state
because of his own convenience and is satisfied that the policy limits will
cover his claim, then he has no reason to sue elsewhere. In many cases his
recovery may even be less than the insurance limits. The plaintiff will
want to avoid multiplicity of suits, and if he prefers to sue in personam
108Developments in the Lau-Res audicata, 65 HARV. L REV. 818, 834 (1952)i Stein,
supra note 4, at 1115.
1'0 Stein, supra note 4, at 1115.
1o0 Cf. State Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Lasky, 454 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970).
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it would be to his advantage to do so initially. Further, the statute of
limitations may run before the plaintiff could commence another action."'
Despite these possibilities, the Seider defendant is really in no worse
position than any other defendant in a quasi in rem action. There is
always the possibility of a later suit elsewhere. A defendant's loss of in-
surance protection after the first suit, while a hardship, is not a constitu-
tional problem as long as the forum state has sufficient state contacts to
allow the attachment which in effect alters the insurance contract." 2  Be-
sides, any defendant may be subjected to recovery in excess of his policy.
The Seider defendant loses only the benefit of having his insurance com-
pany lawyer represent him if there are subsequent suits. Again, his position
is similar to that of a defendant whose real property is attached in a per-
sonal injury action. In such a case, the defendant's insurer would only
be obligated to defend until judgments against him equalled the policy
limits,
Finally a quasi in rem action does not have res judicata effect in an-
other state, so the defendant will be able to relitigate his liability and
may even successfully defend."3 Although the plaintiff may sue several
times because a quasi in rem recovery does not merge his cause of action,
the defendant may have any later judgments against him reduced by the
amount of the prior recovery.114
IV. THE IMPACT OF SEIDER ON OTHER STATES
Despite fears that other states would rush to adopt the Seider rule
to protect their own citizens, or perhaps enact retaliatory laws to impose
conditions on suits against their citizens in New York," 5 only two other
states have approved the Seider rule. No other state permitted a Seider-
type action until 1973, seven years after the doctrine was first announced.
A large number of states faced with the question whether insurance poli-
cies are debts have concluded that they are contingent and unattachable.
Policy reasons as well have provided a basis for rejecting Seider. An
analysis of the decisions in other states demonstrates why the Seider rule
has not gained extensive approval.
A. Other States and the Contingent Liability Problem
The federal district court in Vermont refused to adopt the Seider prin-
11 Siegal, Supplementary Practice Commentary to NYCPLR § 5201 (McKinney Supp.
1972).
112 See text following note 64 supra.
"13 Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 1968) (plaintiff should not
be allowed to use collateral estoppel against defendant in later action); Developments in the
Law-Res .udicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 834 (1952).
114 Siegal, Supplement Practice Commentary to NYCPLR § 5201 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
115 Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 117 (2d Cit. 1968) (Anderson, J., dissenting).
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ciple in Ricker v. Lajoie.n6  An accident occurred in Vermont, involving
a New Hampshire resident insured by a company doing business in Ver-
mont. The facts differ from Seider, however, in that the accident occurred
in the plaintiff's state and the defendant, not the plaintiff, was arguing
than an insurance policy was attachable. The defendant had left the state
after the accident, and the statute of limitations would have run if he
had attachable property in Vermont. The plaintiff contended that the
defendant's insurance policy was not property subject to attachment, and
that therefore the plaintiff could sue because the statute had been tolled
by the defendant's absence from Vermont." 7 The court, stating that the
dissent in Seider was more persuasive than the majority, ruled that the
insurance policy was not property subject to attachment, and therefore the
statute of limitations had not run. Reasoning that the statutory prohibi-
tion against attaching a contingent debt referred to whether or not there
was a debt, rather than whether there was liability, the court found that
there was not yet an obligation or debt free from any contingency. The
insurance policy could not be attached because the insurer might have a
defense (lack of cooperation or failure to notify) which would prevent
liability. The test for property was whether the property would yield to
the creditor a substantial benefit. This insurance policy might yield no
benefit if, for example, the company's defenses against its insured were
valid. Thus, there was no present, certain debt, but only an obligation
contingent on actions yet to be taken.
New York did not use this "substantial benefit" test in deciding the
contingency question. Instead, in New York the value of the obligation
is its stated coverage, not the value of the defense, even though only
the obligation to defend is fixed at the time of the accident."" The valu-
able indemnity protection depends upon a finding of liability, and New
York found this insufficient to make the debt contingent. The two views
differ, then, in that the Vermont federal court looked for ascertainable
benefits at the time of the attachment, whereas New York viewed the
obligation as fixed for attachment purposes when the accident occurs. In
the latter state, the-condition that the plaintiff may not recover until he
has proven negligence goes to the merits and has no bearing on whether
the insurer's obligations are contingent.
South Carolina rejected the Seider doctrine by viewing the "debt," even
116 314 F. Supp. 401 (D. Vt. 1970).
"712 VT. STAT. ANN. § 552 (1973) provides:
[I]f a person is absent from and resides out of the state after a cause of action accrues
against him and before the statute has run, and he has no known property within the
state which can by common process of law be attached, the time of his absence shall
not be taken as a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.
11s Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 113, 216 N.E.2d 312, 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 101
(1966).
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if fixed, to be contingent in value. In Howard v. Allen,'" the plaintiff
was struck by an airplane propeller on the ground in South Carolina. The
defendant (operator of the plane) was an Ohio resident. An attempt to
attach the defendant's liability policy in South Carolina was unsuccessful
because the court found that the insurer owed the defendant nothing until
liability was determined. Even if liability was found, the insurer's obliga-
tion was still dependent upon whether or not the defendant had complied
,with the insurance policy contract:
Both the obligation to indemnify and the obligation to defend are in-
choate, conditional, contingent obligations to the insured. Before they
come into play there must be an external event within-the coverage of the
policy and the performance of all conditions precedent by the insured, in-
cluding his cooperation. There is no obligation to defend until an action
is brought and no obligation to indemnify until a judgment against the
insured is obtained. Even then, if the insurer's obligations to defend and
indemnify are fully performed, there is nothing of economic value to
which the insured may make claim, receive or assign.' 20
Analyzing the policy obligations from the viewpoint of the attaching
creditor, the court in Howard concluded that there was no attachable debt
because an attaching creditor acquires no greater right in the property than
the defendant had when the attachment was made. Property was not
attachable as a debt to the defendant if he had not yet acquired a posses-
sory interest that would allow him to dispose of if. There was no debt
for a fixed amount, and only if the insurance company had breached its
contract with the defendant or if judgment had been rendered would the
insured have an interest in the contractual obligation that would allow
him to dispose of his interest. 2' The result in Howard was particularly
detrimental to the plaintiff, since by the time she brought suit in Ohio,
the statute of limitations had run.1
22
By New York's analysis, the fact that the liability may not develop
does not make the debt contingent (and unassignable) because by its view
there is a fixed obligation; valuation of this obligation will be decided
later as in many assignments. But South Carolina concluded from the
same situation that until liability is proven there is no assignable (and
hence attachable) obligation. The significant difference is that New York
does not consider the uncertain liability to have any bearing on whether
the obligation is fixed. In contrast, South Carolina concluded that without
definite liability the whole obligation is contingent; it is the money value
which is the true subject of the attachment.
"19 254 S.C. 455, 176 S.E.2d 127 (1970).
120 Id. at 460-61, 176 S.E.2d at 129.
121 Id. at 462, 176 S.E.2d at 130.




Missouri expressly rejected the Seider doctrine in State Government
Employees Insurance Co. v. Lasky. 2 3 A Missouri plaintiff sought to attach
the insurance policy of a Rhode Island defendant to recover for damages
in an accident which occurred in Rhode Island. The insurance company
was authorized to do business jn Missouri. The court 'held that the obliga-
tion of the insurance company to defend was not a debt, and not subject
to attachment. Relying upon the dissent in Seider and critical commen-
taries, the court found that under Missouri law a debt must not depend
on any contingency to be attachable; the test was that the indebtedness
must be absolutely due as a money demand. Damages would not be as-
certainable in a Seider attachment until judgment was rendered. The ob-
ligation to defend if suit was properly brought was not due as a money
demand, and the obligation to indemnify would mature only if a judgment
was entered. The court concluded: "It would be difficult to imagine a
so-called indebtedness more contingent and speculative than an action for
personal injuries resulting from the alleged negligence of a defendant."' 24
Under the Missouri requirement that the debt must be absolutely due
as a money demand, the court's conclusion that there was no such debt
is unescapable. Even if the obligation to defend is considered fixed at
the time of the accident (which it is not in Missouri) there still would
be no money absolutely due, and hence no attachment possible. Only
when liability was established would there be a sum certain. New York
does not use the Missouri standard, and the Seider doctrine is incompatible
with such a requirement. In New York only a fixed contractual obligation
to defend and possibly indemnify is required for attachment.'25
In Utah, the contingent aspects of auto liability policies were empha-
sized by the state supreme court, which declined to adopt insurance policy
attachment in Housely v. Anaconda Co.' The defendant Cox, while op-
erating a vehicle owned by the Anaconda Company, injured the plaintiff
in an accident in Utah. Cox left for Maryland and could not be personally
served with process. Because the plaintiffs alleged a separate cause of
action against Cox, they decided to assert quasi in rem jurisdiction over
him by attaching the insurance policy covering the vehicle which he was
driving. A summons was served on Cox and a writ of garnishment was
served upon the insurance company in Maryland; the other defendant,
Anaconda Co. was served personally. The court held that the summons
on Cox was properly quashed by the lower court; at the time of the attach-
ment the insurance company was not indebted to Cox because any rights
12--454 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970).
124 Id. at 950.
12 Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
For an analysis of Lasky and arguments against adopting the Seider procedure in Missouri,
see 36 Mo. L REv, 272 (1971).
126 19 Utah 2d 124, 427 P.2d 390 (1967).
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that the plaintiff might have under the attachment were contingent upon
a judment against Cox. The plaintiff's attempted attachment was consid-
ered to be levied upon an unliquidated tort claim against an insurer. It
was not a chose in action held by the insured against the insurer.1T The
court did not mention Seider in its opinion.
New York did not consider it necessary that the insured have a chose
in action before his insurance policy could be attached. It was enough
that the insured had been in an accident. But in Utah, even if there
was a breach of the insurance contract by the insurer, the insured's rights
against the company were not attachable under the applicable statute.128
This runs counter to the view in Howard that there would be a debt
attachable by the plaintiff if the insurer breached its contract with its in-
sured, because that would provide him with a cause of action against the
company.129 In Utah, only a fixed amount due to the defendant could
have been attached. In this sense Utah's requirements for attachment are
similar to Missouri's and more strict than South Carolina's.
Massachusetts law, as interpreted by a federal court of appeals also
does not allow Seider-type attachment. In Tessier v. State Farm Mutual
Insurance Co.,no the court refused to allow attachment of a deceased Ari-
zona resident's insurance policy by a Massachusetts resident injured in Geor-
gia. None of the states involved had a direct action statute. The plaintiff
argued that by utilizing attachment he was merely avoiding the formality
of obtaining appointment of an ancillary administrator of the insured tort-
feasor. The court rejected this contention because the claims had not yet
matured, liability was a condition precedent to finding an asset within the
state, and an ancillary administrator could not have been appointed. How-
ever, the court did qualify its statements that the "debt" was contingent
by saying that if the policy had been issued in Massachusetts, or if the
defendant was a resident thereof, then the policy could be considered an
asset within the state. The basis for this reasoning was Gordon v. Shea, 3'
a prior Massachusetts case which held that the right of indemnity under
an automobile insurance policy was estate property which would permit
granting of ancillary administration for a non-resident decedent. The
127 The court relied upon Paul v. Kirkendall, 6 Utah 2d 256, 311 P.2d 376 (1957).
In that case, the alleged negligence of an insurance company to settle, which thus subjected
the insured to judgment in excess of the policy limits, was found not to be an attachable
chose in action because of a statute excluding it.
128 UTAH R. Civ. PRO. 64D (n) provides:
Every garnishee shall be allowed to retain or deduct out of the property, effects
or credits of the defendant in his hands all demands against the plaintiff and against
the defendant of which he could have availed himself if he had not been served as
garnishee, whether the same are at the time due or not . . induding unliquidated
damages for the wrongs and injuries ....
129 Howard v. Allen, 254 S.C. 455, 462, 176 S.E.2d 127, 130 (1970).
130458 F.2d 1299 (1st Cir. 1972).
133 300 Mass. 95, 14 N.E. 2d 105 (1938).
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court in Tessier decided that the meaning of "estate" was very limited,
and the standards for whether a policy was an estate for administration
purposes would differ from those for attachment purposes. 132 Therefore,
the court read Seider as holding contrary to Gordon v. Shea.'33 The court's
view is similar to that of South Carolina, Utah, and Missouri in that the
"debt" under the policy was deemed contingent.
The Oklahoma supreme court rejected Seider in Johnson v. Farmers
Alliance Mutual Insurance Co.'34 According to the court, Oklahoma law
simply did not allow attachment when there was no amount absolutely due
beyond any contingency. The court "in good conscience" could not recon-
cile the Seider theory with state law.
B. State Reaction to Other Problems in Seider
Although Seider has been found unacceptable to most of the other
states which have considered the problem, not all rejected insurance policy
attachment because of the contingent aspects of the "debt." Policy reasons
and differing statutory interpretations have also been used to limit Seider's
applicability.
Rhode Island found the Seider doctrine unacceptable because its statu-
tory scheme for attachment of property differed from that of New York.
In De Rentis v. Lewis,' 5 the plaintiffs sued for personal injuries arising
out of an accident in Connecticut allegedly caused by the negligence of
the defendant's daughter. The plaintiffs, Rhode Island residents, sought
to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction by attaching the defendant's liability
insurance policy-a standard Seider-type situation. In addition to claiming
that the insurance contract was attachable property within Rhode Island
(the company was doing business there), the plaintiffs also asserted that
the combination of the contractual relationship and the fact that the insurer
did business with the state was sufficient to permit in personam jurisdiction
over :he out-of-state defendant under the state long arm statute. 3 " While
acknowledging the argument of the defendants that Seider is of question-
able authority even in New York, and that as yet no other state had fol-
132458 F.2d at 1300.
-13 300 Mass. 95, 14 N.E.2d 105 (1938).
134 499 P.2d 1387 (Okla. 1972).
'35 258 A.2d 464 (IL. 1969).
13 6 R.I. GEN. 1, § 9-5-33 (1969) provides:
Every foreign corporation, every individual not a resident of this state . . . that
shall have the necessary minimum contacts with the state of Rhode Island, shall be
subject to the jurisdiction of the state of Rhode Island, and the courts of this state
shall hold such foreign corporations and such nonresident individuals . . . amenable
to suit in Rhode Island.
R.I. GEN. L. § 10-5-7 (1969) provides:
Whenever a writ of attachment can be issued by any court, it may command the
attachment of the goods and chattels of the defendant and his real estate and his per-
sonal estate in the hands or possession of any person.
1973]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
lowed it, the court found it unnecessary to consider the policies underlying
Seider. It held that under Rhode Island law the policy was not attachable;
New York's definition of attachable property, particularly as construed in
Riggle, differed from the Rhode Island interpretation. Furthermore, in
response to the plaintiff's claim of personal jurisdiction, the court said that
the necessary minimum contacts were not present. The court did not con-
sider the limitation which in New York was considered crucial to uphold-
ing Seider-that by proceeding quasi in rem there could be no personal
jurisdiction and thus no judgment in excess of the policy limits.
Whether Rhode Island law had permitted suit against the insurer by
attachment or not, the plaintiff's claim of personal jurisdiction could not
have been upheld. It would not be in accordance with constitutional doc-
trines to permit personal jurisdiction over the insured on the ground that
his insurance company met the minimum contacts test. The existence of
an attachable debt owed by a corporation present in the state does not
provide a sufficient basis for asserting that a judgment in excess of that
debt may be entered against the individual to whom that debt is owed.
Only quasi in rem liability may be imposed by the Seider doctrine. This
concept is crucial, and whatever other reasons may exist for adopting or
rejecting Seider, the procedure should not be allowed without this limita-
tion. The existence of a debt for quasi in rem purposes and the presence
of a corporation for in personam jurisdiction are separate concepts. Other-
wise, the result has the effect of a long arm statute, asserting personal
jurisdiction not because the defendant committed a tort within the state,
but because his insurance company owes him a "debt" there. Limited
liability is the sine qua non of the Seider doctrine.
Louisiana rejected Seider despite its statute which permits direct actions
against insurance *companies. In Kirchman v. Mikula,137 the court refused
to permit a Louisiana resident injured in New Jersey to attach the New
Jersey defendant's liability insurance policy in Louisiana. While noting
that Seider had been rejected by other states because the policy obligations
might not be converted into a money debt, the court found it unnecessary
to follow that approach in Louisiana. The state's direct action statute was
available for persons injured within the state or for those who sue upon
an insurance policy written or delivered within the state. Therefore the
court concluded that the legislature had not intended to extend a direct
action to residents injured in another state by a non-resident covered by
a policy issued out-of-state. The Fifth Circuit had reached the same con-
dusion in a case previously filed by the same plaintiff. 38
137258 So. 2d 701 (La. App. 1972).
13 SKirchman v. Mikula, 443 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1971).
[Vol. 34
NOTES
C. Expansion of Seider to California and Minnesota
California judicially adopted Seider in Turner v. Evers,3' a 1973 case;
this was the first decision outside New York to follow rather than reject
Seider. Turner did not involve an automobile accident, but rather arose
out of breach of contract and negligence claims due to allegedly faulty re-
pairs performed in the state of Washington upon an automobile belonging
to California residents. The vehicle had become inoperative shortly after
it was serviced, and the plaintiffs sought to recover damages in California
by attaching the liability insurance policy of the Washington service station
operator. His insurer was doing business in California. The municipal
court granted the motion to quash, but the appellate court reversed.
The Turner court relied heavily upon Seider in permitting insurance
policy attachment in California. Seider was constitutional, and since the
California Code of Civil Procedure'40 authorized the state to exercise juris-
diction on any basis not inconsistent with the state or federal constitutions,
the process was permissible in the state. But the court adopted a new
reading of Seider; although it held that attachment is proper when there
is an obligation to indemnify and only a possibility of judgment against
the insured, it emphasized that Seider did not require that the policy obli-
gations be debts as distinguished from other property. 41 The defendant
had argued (as have practically all Seider-type defendants) that the valid-
ity of the attachment depended upon whether the insurer's obligations were
a debt, but Judge Goldberg said that this argument was not on point. The
California statutes did not limit attachment to debts, but extended it to all
property of nonresident defendants. 14 Property had been broadly defined
to include an insurer's obligation to defend and indemnify in a California
estate case 143  (California's counterpart to Riggle), and since the right of
a nonresident decedent against his insurer was sufficient property to confer
probate jurisdiction, it was also property sufficient for attachment by a
plaintiff. The court indicated that Seider did not require that there be a
debt, but only that there be property. The statement in Seider that "'as
soon as the accident occurred there was imposed ... a contractual obliga-
tion which should be considered a "debt" . . . '" did not mean that an
actual debt must be found. 44 Since the insurer's obligations were property
there was no need to determine whether they created a debt as well.
The court's analysis partially resembles the Seider court's treatment of
Riggle, but some of the Turner court's language implies that insurance pol-
139 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 11, 107 Ca. Rptr. 390 (1973).
140 CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 410.10 (West 1973).
141 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 19, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
142 Id. at 20, 107, Cal. Rptr. at 396.
143 Keck v. Superior Court, 3 Civil 13521 (Super. Ct., Nov. 14, 1972).
14431 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 19, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
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icy obligations can be deemed property without an initial finding that they
are non-contingent obligations. Such a finding was crucial in Seider, but
in Turner the court discussed the non-contingency of the obligations to de-
fend and indemnify as only an additional reason why California law was
similar to New York, thus making attachment possible. Yet the court
noted that the California rule Was that a debt uncertain and contingent
could not be attached. If the court was abandoning the Seider requirement
that there be a fixed debt and relying only upon the estate concept of prop-
erty, it is unclear why the contingent aspects of insurance policy obligations
were even relevant. Such an analysis is important only to determination
of a debt, and if there was no need to find a debt, the fact that certain pol-
icy obligations were fixed would not amount to an additional reason for
allowing attachment. Since Seider expressly states that the contractual
obligations were debts within New York law,145 the Turner court may have
inadvertently recognized the it is essential that an uncpnditional obligation
be found before the policy can be attached as property, despite statements
to the contrary.
It may be an incorrect reading of Seider to state that no debt must be
found; the New York cases imply that while property is attachable, an
insurance policy is attachable only because it is a debt which is certain.
Property and debt are distinguishable when attachment of either is sought.
The whole question in Seider was "whether [the insurer's] contractual
obligation to defendant is a debt or cause of action such as may be at-
tached." 146 The New York statute even provides: "Any debt or property
... is subject to attachment."'1 47 And regardless of the label, even Cali-
fornia implies that a contingency may prevent attachment.148
Nevertheless, Turner could provide the foundation for wider accept-
ance of insurance policy attachment. Not only does the process have the
approval of the two largest states, but Turner could be interpreted to en-
able states to fit attachment of insurance obligations within their own statu-
tory schemes more easily than the Seider "debt" analysis permits. Turnel-s
reliance on the estate property concept indicates that whether or not a state
could find the policy obligations to be an absolute debt, if the state deems
the duty of defense and indemnification to be property for estate purposes,
the obligation could also be property for purposes of attachment. But this
is an oversimplification of the Seider rationale. An unconditional obliga-
tion should be found, whether termed property or debt. States will still
be forced to struggle with the contingent liability aspects of insurance obli-
gations in the search for some res which can be attached within particular
'45 17 N.Y.2d at 113, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101. Accord, Simpson v. Loeh-
man, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 310, 234 N.E.2d 669, 671, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 636 (1967).
146 17 N.Y.2d at 113, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
147 NYCPLR § 6202.
14831 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 21, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
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state law. But by broadening the inquiry into a search for property rather
than looking solely for a debt, which is fixed and therefore attachable, the
California court has provided the basis for an alternate analysis of insur-
ance policy attachment.
Minnesota is the most recent state in which Seider-type attachment was
successfully attempted. In August, 1973, the Minnesota federal district
court held in Rintala v. Shoemaker149 that a Minnesota resident properly
obtained quasi in rem jurisdiction over a Michigan defendant by attaching
his insurance policy. The insurer was doing business in Minnesota, and
the plaintiff was suing for wrongful death arising out of a Florida auto-
mobile accident.
Jurisdiction was proper, although contingent obligations could not be
attached, because a recent state statute 5° provided that garnishment was
proper before judgment when an insurance policy was the subject and the
insurer might be found liable. This statute overcame the contingent debt
problem for which the Seider doctrine was frequently criticized. But on
the basis of Minichiello v. Rosenberg'51 the court placed restrictions on
the process not provided in the statute. Proper notice to the defendant
was required, recovery must be limited to the value of the policy, and the
person seeking attachment must be a Minnesota resident. The defendant
was entitled to limited liability even though Minnesota law did not provide
for a limited appearance in quasi in rem cases.
Attachment in Minnesota is therefore permissible as long as the judi-
cially developed safeguards developed in New York are applied. Because
of the statute permitting insurance policy attachment, no strained construc-
tion of either debt or property was necessary. The court did cite Turner,
but did not discuss the California interpretation of Seider. Such discussion
would have been unnecessary due to statutory declaration.
V. SEIDER CAN SURVIVE
New York, California, and Minnesota have demonstrated that courts
are more or less free, depending upon their own state law interpretations,
to conclude that liability insurance obligations are not contingent and are
therefore attachable. Quasi in rem jurisdiction, limited to the stated policy
149 362 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Minn. 1973).
15 0 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 571.41 (Subd. 2) (West 1969), provides:
Subd. 2 Garnishment shall be permitted before judgment in the following in-
stances only:
(1) For the purpose of establishing quasi in rem jurisdiction [when] ...
(c) the defendant is a nonresident individual ....
(2) When the garnishee and the debtor are parties to a contract of surety-
ship, guarantee, or insurance, because of which the garnishee may be held to
respond to any person for the daim asserted against the debtor i6 the main action.
151 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844, rehearing denied, 396 U.S.
949 (1969).
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value, would then be permissible. If, however, a state court should decide
that the insurer's obligation is not contingent, the state must decide whether
public policy reasons warrant, and constitutional requirements allow, Sei-
der-type attachments.
A constitutional basis for the attachment may be found in the state's
interest in protecting its citizens and avoiding the necessity of caring for
them at public expense. This, coupled with the state's control over an
insurer doing business in the state and the fact that the insurance company
is the real defendant, provides the requisite minimal contacts with the state.
These contracts are close enough to the traditional requirement that there
must be property located within the forum state, such that the state exer-
cises power and control over it, to permit quasi in rem jurisdiction.
Res judicata questions created when a plaintiff attempts a second suit
in another state are answered by the recognition that a quasi in rem judg-
ment is valid only as to the property attached and is not res judicata either
for or against the defendant. Although there might be hardships to a de-
fendant against whom the plaintiff brings additional suits, it is important
to realize that this possibility has always existed with quasi in rem actions.
The defendant is as adequately protected in Seider cases as in other quasi
in rem actions. The plaintiff could derive no benefit from the prior judg-
ment, unless he regards it as beneficial that the defendant might no longer
have an insurance company to defend him. That would be unfortunate,
but it does not violate due process: any quasi in rem action could cause
such a result. And since it would be possible and often more profitable
for a plaintiff to initiate an in personani action in the state of the accident
or in the defendant's state, the plaintiff normally would have little incen-
tive to use the Seider procedure at all. The plaintiff should at least be
aware that possible multiplicity of actions and statute of limitations dangers
make in personam alternatives more desirable unless the convenience of
his home state forum outweighs the other factors.
The multiple attachment problem, although highly speculative, requires
a solution. Courts should limit attachment of liability insurance policies
to plaintiffs suing for injuries arising out of occurrences covered by the
policy. The insured should not be deprived of his policy benefits because
of attachment by a contract creditor after the accident but before the plain-
tiff injured in the action has initiated a quasi in rem action. The policy can
be of little value to a contract creditor until liability covered by the policy
has been established. Only if the litigation subsequent and pursuant to
the attachment determines that the defendant-insured is liable and hence
protected by the policy obligation to indemnify should attachment be al-
lowed. This would preclude attachment by creditors who were not in-
volved with the occurrence that caused the policy obligation to become
a "debt." If the public policy reat -n for permitting the attachment is
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to protect an injured resident, who without the insurance payment might
need state financed care, then this limitation is in compliance with the
intention of the Seider doctrine. The critical -requiremeitt must be that
the litigation between the parties to the attachment will determine whether
or not the defendant is liable for the alleged acts which created the in-
surer's obligation to defend. The action used as a basis for the attachment
must be one within the contemplation of the insurance policy; the policy
obligations may be considered a debt only with respect to persons who
would be covered by an in personam action against the insured. Since
the insurer would not be required to indemnify a defendant found to owe
a contract debt, the contract creditor could not attach the defendant-in-
sured's insurance policy.
If a state decides that it wishes to provide another forum in which
its residents may sue quasi in rem, there is little reason to prohibit it from
doing so if due process standards are met and other safeguards provided.
The emphasis should be on the bearing which the local contacts have
on the demands of justice and fairness. 152  If every state were to create
Seider-type procedures, a defendant would simply be subjected to suit in
an extra forum if the defendants insurer was doing business in the plain-
tiff's state, but potential liability would be limited. Long arm statutes pro-
vided more. If a court, in its discretion, finds too much inconvenience for
the defendant, the action could be dismissed and then transferred under the
state's forum non conveniens rule. If the state has no such rule (and
the suit is not in federal court) then the action should be permitted be-
cause it has already been determined that the policy reasons for allowing
such suit are founded on constitutional principles.'5 Since there is no
due process violation, the absence of discretionary power to transfer the
action does not make the Seider procedure unconstitutional. Further, dis-
missal on forum non conveniens grounds would defeat the purpose of the
Seider system; the plaintiff would be deprived of the quasi in rem action
which the state has decided he has a right to maintain. Therefore, a forum
non conveniens dismissal should only be granted in exceptional circun-
stances.' 54 The policy decision, upheld by constitutional standards, has
15 2 In Search of a Rationale, supra note 5, at 422.
15 3 See Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 110 (1968). But see In Search of a
Rationale, supra note 5, at 419-21.
154 Contra, Stein, supra note 4, at 1133-34. Professor Stein urges an expansion of forum
non conveniens rules to deter Seider-type actions. This deterrent effect would undoubtedly
result, but the point is that New York, California, and Minnesota consider such actions desirable
insofar as the state's legitimate concerns justify expanding quasi in rem jurisdiction. It would
be anomolous for a state to provide its residents with a Seider alternative and then do everything
possible to discourage them from using it. If the state interest in allowing New York plaintiffs
to sue in their own state is sufficient, then there is no due process problem if the defendant
does have to defend in that state. His inconvenience is outweighed by countervailing forces.
The courts should not frustrate state policy by too liberally granting forum non conveniens
dismissals. A case by case inquiry into the convenience of the parties would be burdensome,
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been made to provide another forum. Due process has been satisfied. Jus-
tice is deemed to be provided by the attachment procedure, and the choice
as to which forum will exercise jurisdiction should normally remain with
the plaintiff, not the court. The outrage expressed by a distant defendant
who must travel to defend in a state where he may never have been is
rather hollow when compared to the injustice to a party injured by that
defendant's negligence who must forego recovery because he is unable to
travel to the state of the accident or the defendant's residence to sue.
Seider and its supporting cases represent an extension of the quasi in rem
attachment procedure. They also signify a necessary redefinition of rights
and liabilities arising under attachment proceedings, as well as recognition
of the true position of insurance companies. This clarification helps to
justify the attachment process permitted against liability insurance policies
and makes it a worthwhile extension of quasi in rem jurisdiction. But
it is unfortunate that such a momentous and complex redefinition was
initiated, and is now slowly being solved, by the courts rather than the
legislatures.
Karl E. May
and should not be undertaken. The presumption must be that the Seider-type action will
stand, and only in exceptional circumstances should dismissal be granted. Naturally critics
of Seider urge wide use of the forum non conveniens doctrine. But if the Seider procedure
implements sound state policy, as the courts say that it does, then the New York residents
should almost always be allowed to maintain their action in their home state.
